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Abstract 
We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation 
of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper esponses to sequences of 
observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound 
relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic onditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, 
the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements 
of an epistemic state that are not necessarily captured by a belief set. We also show that a simple 
modification to the AGM framework can allow belief revision to be a function of epistemic states. 
We establish a model-based representation theorem which characterizes the proposed postulates 
and constrains, in turn, the way in which entrenchment orderings may be transformed under 
iterated belief revision. 
Keywords: Iterated revision; AGM postulates; Conditional beliefs; Probabilistic onditioning; Epistemic 
states; Qualitative probability 
1. Introduction 
The process of belief change has been formalized in several frameworks, most notably 
nonmonotonic logic, probabilistic reasoning, and belief revision. In nonmonotonic logic 
(e.g., [ 2 1 ] ), belief change is viewed as a byproduct of extending a database containing 
new facts in accordance with a set of extension-construction rules called “defaults”. 
In probabilistic reasoning (e.g., [ 10,13,23,24] >, belief change is viewed as a byprod- 
uct of conditioning a probability function (or some qualitative abstraction thereof) on 
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new evidence, in accordance with Bayes’ rule. In the belief revision framework, belief 
changes are characterized by a set of constraints (called “postulates”) on an operator o 
which modifies the set $J of currenily held beliefs to produce a new belief set Ic, o p, 
implying the new information ,u. 
While many studies have emphasized features that are common to the three frame- 
works above (e.g., [ 8,9,14,22] ), serious incompatibilities have also been observed that 
point to some fundamental limitations and inadequacies of the operator-based approach 
to belief revision [3-5,131. This paper addresses one such limitation, the failure of 
the standard belief revision framework, as encapsulated in the AGM postulates [ 11, to 
properly regulate iterated belief revision, that is, the sequential revision of beliefs in 
response to a string of observations. 
We will first demonstrate that the AGM postulates, as they currently stand, are too 
permissive to enforce plausible iterated revisions, and need to be strengthened by addi- 
tional constraints. We will then argue that any rational system of belief change should 
comply with four postulates which are not part of the AGM lexicon, and which are 
necessary to maintain plausible behavior under iterated belief change. Finally, we will 
show that one of these postulates stands contrary to the basic tenet of the operator-based 
framework and, hence, the framework should be broadened to permit operations on 
epistemic states, rather than belief sets. 
To understand the requirements imposed by iterated revision we should start by 
recalling the distinction between belief sets and epistemic states. A belief set $ char- 
acterizes the set of propositions to which an agent is committed at any given time. 
An epistemic state contains, in addition to @, the entire information needed for coher- 
ent reasoning, including, in particular, the very strategy of belief revision which the 
agent wishes to employ at that given time. Any such strategy encodes, and is equiv- 
alent to, a set of “conditional beliefs”, that is, beliefs that one is prepared to adopt 
conditioned on any hypothetical evidence [ 2,3,15,16,19,20]. To fully specify behav- 
ior under successive observations, one must encode, not merely how beliefs are to be 
revised (this is enough for the first stage only) but also how the revision strategy 
itself is to be modified by each new evidence. This amounts, in turns, to specifying 
which conditional beliefs are to be retained and which ones deleted with each piece of 
evidence. 
The hallmark of the AGM postulates is the principle of minimal belief change, that 
is, the need to preserve as much of earlier beliefs as possible and to add only those 
beliefs that are absolutely compelled by the revision specified. But despite this emphasis 
on preserving propositional beliefs, the AGM postulates place almost no constraints on 
the preservation of conditional beliefs. The reason is that the AGM theory is expressed 
mainly in terms of one-step postulates which tell us what properties the next belief 
set ought to have, given the current belief set and the current evidence. However, the 
language of one-step postulates is not rich enough to regulate conditional beliefs because 
such a language deals only with transformation of belief sets and not with transformation 
of revision policies as encoded in epistemic states. 
In fact, a central result of the AGM theory states that the postulates are equivalent to 
the existence of a total pre-order on all propositions according to their degree of epistemic 
erltrenchment such that belief revisions always retain more entrenched propositions in 
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preference to less entrenched ones. But this ordering, which carries the information 
necessary for belief revision, cannot be always constrained using the language of one- 
step postulates, hence, the postulates cannot always regulate how the ordering transforms 
during belief revision. 
Since the relative entrenchment among hypothetical beliefs is crucial for distinguishing 
future beliefs from future disbeliefs, the preservation of this relative entrenchment in 
accordance with some minimal-change principle is as important as the preservation of 
beliefs themselves. Moreover, since the information content of this relative entrenchment 
is equivalent to that of conditional beliefs, the preservation of the former requires 
postulates about the latter, namely, two-step postulates about the revision of conditional 
beliefs. 
The over-permissiveness of the AGM postulates relative to changes in conditional 
beliefs has been noted by several workers [ 3,191, including the AGM authors them- 
selves [ 2,8], but attempts at applying preservation principles to conditional beliefs have 
not been very successful. Gardenfors, for example, has tried the sweeping remedy of 
including in the belief set not merely propositional beliefs but conditional beliefs as 
well, and quickly faltered into an inconsistency known as Gardenfors’ triviality result 
[8, pp. 156-1661. Attempts at circumventing this result now make up voluminous lit- 
erature which, by and large, seems still reluctant to accept the fact that conditional 
and propositional beliefs are two different species which require totally different preser- 
vation policies. More recently, Boutilier has suggested a promising approach by de- 
vising a belief revision operator, called natural revision, which still restricts a belief 
set to propositional beliefs, but provably preserves as many conditional beliefs as the 
AGM postulates would permit [3]. We show in this paper, however, that this strat- 
egy, too, is an excessive remedy to the AGM weakness and leads to counterintuitive 
results. As it turns out, if one insists on preserving all conditional beliefs permitted 
by AGM, then one is forced to retract some propositional beliefs that ought to be 
preserved. 
The solution we suggest for preserving conditional beliefs is more cautious. Viewing 
belief revision as an operation on epistemic states, we show that conditional beliefs 
can be classified succinctly into two distinct categories; those that may compromise 
propositional beliefs if preserved, and those that may not. We then insist on preserv- 
ing only the second category of conditional beliefs, and we do this proposing four 
postulates. 2 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the AGM 
proposal and present a number of scenarios that are consistent with the AGM pos- 
tulates and yet exhibit counterintuitive changes in conditional beliefs. Next, we pro- 
pose a modification of the AGM postulates in which revisions are applied to epis- 
temic states instead of belief sets and argue that such modification is necessary for 
a satisfactory treatment of iterated belief revision. We then analyze in Section 4 the 
minimal-change principle of conditional beliefs. Based on this analysis, we propose four 
postulates in Section 5 that properly preserve conditional beliefs-hence, regulating iter- 
’ The postulates we propose are inspired by a method for belief change suggested by Spohn \23,24 ] and 
extended by Goldszmidt [ I I, 121. 
4 A. Danviche, J. Pearl/ArtQicial Intelligence 89 (1997) l-29 
ated revisions-and provide a representation theorem for the newly proposed postulates 
which extends the one provided by Katsuno and Mendelzon for the AGM postulates 
[ 171. We then show in Section 6 that the new postulates are sound with respect to 
a qualitative version of Jeffrey’s rule of probabilistic conditioning. In Section 7, we 
provide further insights behind the choice of our postulates and conclude in Section 8 
by discussing current and future related work. Proofs of theorems are delegated to 
Appendix B. 
2. Belief revision 
Belief revision is the process of changing a belief set to accommodate evidence that is 
possibly inconsistent with existing beliefs. Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson have 
proposed eight postulates to govern the process of belief revision, which are phrased 
in a very general setting and are known as the AGM postulates [ 1,8]. Katsuno and 
Mendelzon (KM) rephrased these postulates assuming a propositional logic setting, 
yielding postulates (Rl)-(R6) that are shown below [ 171. 
According to the KM formulation, a belief set is represented by a sentence I+? in 
a propositional language .C, where any sentence that is entailed by $ is part of the 
belief set. Evidence is also represented using a sentence /..L in language 13. The result 
of revising (I/ with ,X is a sentence belonging to C that is denoted by (I, o ,u, where 
o is called a belief revision operator. The KM formulation of the AGM postulates 
follows: 
(R 1) Cc, o ,u implies ,u. 
(R2) If Cc, A ,U is satisfiable, then $ o ,CL = + A ,x. 
(R3) If ,u is satisfiable, then G o ,u is also satisfiable. 
(R4) If $1 = $2 and ,ut z ,LQ, then $1 o ,UI = @2 o ,LQ. 
(R5) (I$ o ,LL) A C$ implies $ o (,u A 4). 
(R6) If ($ o ,u) A 4 is satisfiable, then 1,9 o (p A 4) implies (+ 0 ,u) A 4. 
Katsuno and Mendelzon provided a representation theorem for postulates (Rl)-(R6) 
which shows an equivalence between the postulates and a revision mechanism based on 
total pre-orders [ 171: 
Definition 1. Let W be the set of all worlds (interpretations) of a propositional language 
C. A function that maps each sentence Cc, in L to a total pre-order <e on worlds W is 
called a faithful assignment if and only if: 
(1) w],w2 + 1+9 only if wi =e 6~2; 
(2) 01 /= r,!? and w:! F Cc, only if wi <* ~2; and 
(3) $ = 4 only if $=+. 
Here, WI <+ w2 is defined as wi <Q w2 and w2 &, WI; wt =$ w:! is defined as 
wt Q, w2 and w2 & wi. 
The following representation theorem shows that a revision operator is equivalent to 
a faithful assignment where the result of a revision $ o ,U is determined by ,u and the 
total pre-order assigned to +: 
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Theorem 2 (Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 171). A revision operator o satisfies postu- 
lates (Rl)-(R6) precisely when there exists a faithful assignment that maps each 
sentence 9 into a total pre-order Q, such that 
Mods($op) =min(Mods(~)),<~). 
Here, Mods( ,u) is the set of all worlds satisfying ,uu; und min(Mods( ,u), <*) contains 
all worlds that are minimal in Mods(,u) according to the total pre-order <$. 
In the remainder of this section, we shall consider a number of revision operators 
that conform to the AGM postulates but lead to counterintuitive changes in conditional 
beliefs. 
Definition 3. A belief set Cc, accepts proposition /3 given proposition (Y precisely when 
p is entailed by the revision of @ with (Y; that is, q5 0 LY k /?. We also say in this case 
that /3] (Y is a conditional belief of I,+. 3 
Our first scenario shows that an agent consistent with the AGM postulates may give 
up a conditional belief unjustifiably. 
Example 4. We see a strange new animal X at a distance, and it appears to be barking 
like a dog, so we conclude that X is not a bird, and that X does not fly. Still, in the event 
that X turns out to be a bird, we are prepared to change our mind and conclude that 
X flies, Observing the animal closely, we realize that it actually can fly. The question 
now is whether we should retain our willingness to believe that X flies in case X turns 
out to be a bird after all. We submit that it would be strange to give up this conditional 
belief merely because we happened to observe that X can fly. Yet, we provide later an 
AGM-compatible revision operator o that permits such behavior: 4 
9 E Third A +ies, 
q!~ o bird z bird A flies, 
(* OJEies) 0 bird z bird. 
The example we just considered involves an agent that gives up a conditional belief 
unjustifiably, while remaining consistent with the AGM postulates. Our next example 
shows that an agent consistent with the AGM postulates may acquire a conditional belief 
unjustifiably. 
s This definition should not be viewed as a position on how to interpret “conditionals”. The phrase “condi- 
tional belief p / a” is simply a shortcut for the more elaborate statement “fi will be accepted after revising 
our current beliefs by a”. All of our discussion below can be made free of the term “conditional belief’ if we 
opt to, except that it will generate sentences that am not easy to parse. We stress this point since traditional 
problems associated with the treatment of conditionals are mostly irrelevant to our current topic. 
‘We are using the same revision operator to accommodate different pieces of evidence in this and further 
examples. Some may argue, however, that the AGM theory does not sanction any form of iterated revisions, 
or, more specifically, that it does not propose using the same revision operator for handling iterated revisions. 
Our examples, however, are applicable even if one uses different revision operators to accommodate different 
pieces of evidence. 
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Example 5. We are introduced to a lady X who sounds smart and looks rich, so we 
believe that X is smart and X is rich. Moreover, since we profess to no prejudice, 
we also maintain that X is smart even if found to be poor and, conversely, X is rich 
even if found to be not smart. Now, we obtain some evidence that X is in fact not 
smart and we remain of course convinced that X is rich. Still, it would be strange 
for us to say, “If the evidence turns out false, and X turns out smart after all, we 
would no longer believe that X is rich”. If we currently believe X is smart and rich, 
then evidence first refuting then supporting that X is smart should not in any way 
change our opinion about X being rich. Strangely, the AGM postulates do permit such a 
change of opinion. We will provide later an AGM-compatible revision operator o such 
that 
$ E stnart A rich, 
9 o w-ich E smart A -rich, 
$ 0 vmart = Tsmart A rich, 
(@ 0 Tsmart) 0 smart E smart A vich. 
The common feature permitting us to construct these examples is that while the AGM 
postulates constrain what revisions are permissible from a given belief set +, under 
different propositions p, they, in general, do not constrain how revisions must cohere 
when starting from different belief states. This is seen more clearly from Theorem 2, 
where the order <,J, does not constrain the order $,, except trivially.’ 
3. Epistemic states versus belief sets 
The examples we presented in the previous section show that the AGM postulates 
are too weak to regulate changes in conditional beliefs. Our solution to this problem is 
given in Section 5 where we augment these postulates with four additional ones that 
regulate such change. The choice of proposed postulates is not arbitrary, however. It 
is motivated by a careful analysis of such regulation which we conduct in Section 4. 
In this section, we present a modification of postulates (RI ) -( R6), which we argue is 
necessary for turning the operator o into a genuine belief revision operator, worthy of 
the expectation that such a title evokes. The modified set of postulates will be the basis 
of our treatment of iterated revisions. 
The modification we shall suggest to postulates (RI )-( R6) is a weakening of pos- 
tulate (R4), which makes belief revision a function of an epistemic state instead of 
a belief set.6 Each epistemic state q has an associated belief set, denoted Bef( P), 
which is a propositional sentence. The belief set of F does not characterize ?P uniquely; 
therefore, it is possible to have two different epistemic states with equivalent belief 
sets. 
s The orders <e and <eOF are constrained by the properties of faithful assignments. 
h A similar modification has independently been proposed in 17 I. 
A. Darwiche, J. Pearl/Artijicial Intelligence 89 (I 997) 1-29 I 
The modification of postulates (Rl)-(R6) leads to postulates (R* l)-( R*6) which 
are shown below. To simplify notation, we are adopting the following convention in 
the rest of the paper: We use p instead of &l(p) whenever it is embedded in a 
propositional formula. For example, we will write W b (Y to mean Bel(p) + cu; !J’ A 4 
to mean Bel(lV) A 4; ly z @ to mean Bel(lV) E Bel(@); and so on. However, ly o ,u 
will stand for the epistemic state, not belief set, that results from the revision by p. 
With this notation at hand, the modified AGM postulates are: 
(R*l) W o ,u implies ,u. 
(R*2) If T A ,U is satisfiable, then p o p E V’ A ,u. 
(R*3) If ,X is satisfiable, then ly o ,U is also satisfiable. 
(R*4) If Wr = !lf2 and ,ur E ,u2, then pt o ,ur 5 W2 o ,u2. 
(R*5) (*o,~)A(bimplies~o(~~$~). 
(R*6) If ( W o p) A 4 is satisfiable, then p o (p A 4) implies (Ik o p) A 4. 
There are only two differences between these postulates and (Rl )-( R6). First, a revision 
is applied to an epistemic state p instead of a belief set $. Second, postulate (R*4) is 
a weakening of postulate (R4), which, in our notation, reads: 
(R4) If Wr - p2 and ,XI z ~2, then Wr o ,~r = W2 o ~2. 
Postulate (R4) says that if epistemic states 1vr and 1y2 have equivalent belief sets 
(qr - ?&), then they must lead to equivalent belief sets when revised using equivalent 
evidence. Postulate (R*4), in contrast, is more cautious; it requires the epistemic states 
to be identical (qr = q2) for this to be the case. 
Having broadened the AGM framework to operate on epistemic states, we also broaden 
Definition 3 accordingly. 
Definition 6. An epistemic state p accepts proposition p given proposition CY precisely 
when p is entailed by the revision of p with cu; that is, p o (Y b p. We also say in this 
case that p 1 a is a conditional belief of ly, written ly + /3 1 a. 
In Section 5 we will strengthen this new framework with additional postulates, so 
as to properly regulate iterated belief revision. But, first, we offer further rationale for 
weakening (R4) into (R*4). 
While several researchers have recognized the need to formulate revision at the epis- 
temic state level [ 4,7, 15,16,19,22], the specific modification of the AGM postulates 
in the manner proposed above was inspired by recent studies of Freund and Lehmann 
who have effectively shown that (Rl )-(R6) clash with one of the postulates, called 
(C2), that we propose later [ 61. It turns out (Section 6)) however, that postulate (R4) 
alone is the culprit for the clash. Thus the problem arises whether one should retain pos- 
tulate (R4) and weaken (C2) or the other way around, weaken (R4) to uphold (C2). 
We argue for the latter approach by demonstrating that postulate (R4) stands contrary 
to common standards of plausibility, because it encapsulates the overly restrictive re- 
quirement that revision should be a function of belief sets instead of epistemic states. 
We will next illustrate by example the counterintuitive consequences of this restriction. 
Example 7 (Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 131). Two jurors in a murder trial possess differ- 
ent biases; juror-l believes “A is the murderer, B is a remote but unbelievable possibility 
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while C is definitely innocent”. Juror-2 believes “A is the murderer, C is a remote but 
unbelievable possibility while B is definitely innocent”. The two jurors share the same 
belief set $1 E $2 = “A is the only murderer”. A surprising evidence now obtains: 
,u = “A is not the murderer” (A has produced a reliable alibi). Clearly, any rational ac- 
count of belief revision should allow juror- 1 to uphold a different belief set than juror-2. 
Yet any approach based on a revision operator that satisfies postulate (R4) dictates that 
@i o p z $2 o ,u, which is an indefensible position. 
We conclude this section by providing a representation theorem for postulates (R* 1) - 
(R*6), which parallels Theorem 2: 
Definition 8. Let W be the set of all worlds (interpretations) of a propositional language 
C and suppose that the belief set of any epistemic state belongs to ,!Z. A function that 
maps each epistemic state P to a total pre-order <y on worlds W is said to be afaithful 
assignment if and only if: 
(1) wi,w2 + 9 only if wi =V 02; 
(2) wt k P and 0~2 /& P only if WI <F ~2; and 
(3) P = @ only if <v=<Q. 
Here, wi <P w2 is defined as WI <y w:! and wz $P WI; QQ =P wz is defined as 
WI <V w2 and w2 6~ WI. 
Theorem 9. A revision operator o satisfies postulates (R* l)-(R*6) precisely when 
there exists a faithful assignment that maps each epistemic state P to a total pre-order 
Gq such that 
Mods(!Pop) =min(Mods(p),<v). 
That is, the representation theorem for postulates (RI) -( R6) continues to hold for the 
modified set of postulates, with only one difference. The equivalence Bel( W) E Be/( @) 
is not sufficient to imply \<P=&; the stronger condition P = @ is needed instead. 
4. Minimizing changes in conditional beliefs 
The examples we presented in Section 2 show that the AGM postulates are too 
weak to regulate changes in conditional beliefs, thus permitting improper responses to 
sequences of observations. To address this weakness, we shall propose four postulates 
in Section 5 that properly preserve conditional beliefs and, hence, provide new criteria 
for testing the coherence of iterated belief revision. 
A subtle issue relating to our postulates is identifying those changes in conditional 
beliefs that must be minimized. For example, if we were to opt for a radical strategy 
of change minimization, then adding postulate (CB) below to the AGM postulates will 
suffice because it guarantees that conditional beliefs are preserved as much as the AGM 
postulates permit: 
(CB) If’P.,u+ ~a, then (q o ,u) o CY E P o LY. 
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However, such a radical strategy would be excessive. We will first discuss the reason 
why postulate (CB) minimizes changes in conditional beliefs and then show why it 
leads to counterintuitive results. 
4.1. Absolute minimization 
Consider the following lemma: 
LemmalO. ?P j=;Pj p CY recisely when there exists a world w such that w k LY A p and 
w<~o’foranyo’+cxA~@ 
Therefore, the pre-order 6~ associated with an epistemic state ?P encodes the condi- 
tional beliefs accepted by ?P and, similarly, the pre-order <pop encodes the conditional 
beliefs accepted by P o ,u. Hence, one can minimize changes in conditional beliefs due 
to a revision by making the pre-orders <P and <qOP as similar as possible, which is 
exactly what postulate (CB) does: 
Theorem 11. Suppose that a revision operator satisfies postulates (R*l)-(R*6). The 
operator satis$es postulate (CB) iff the operator and its corresponding faithful assign- 
ment satisfy: 
(CBR) If ~1, w2 k l(P 0 CL), then WI <P w ifs WI GOP ~2. 
That is, according to postulate (CB), the order imposed by <qOF on two worlds in 
Mods( ~(9 0 ,u) ) should be the same as that imposed on them by &,v. Note also that the 
order imposed by <pop on other types of worlds is determined by the AGM postulates. 
Specifically, the faithfulness of <pOF ensures that: 
(1) IfW1,W21=~o0,thenwl=go~W2. 
(2) If WI k !P o ,u and w2 k -(P o p), then WI +OP w2. 
Therefore, once the total pre-order <q is known, postulate (CB) together with the AGM 
postulates determine the total pre-order <qOP completely. 
4.2. Is absolute minimization desirable? 
Absolute minimization of changes in conditional beliefs is due to Boutilier who 
suggested minimizing these changes as much as the AGM postulates permit [3]. 
In fact, condition (CBR) is effectively Boutilier’s definition of natural revision, and 
postulate (CB) is a property that Boutilier has proven about his method of revi- 
sion [3]. 
Although postulate (CB) rules out the counterintuitive revision scenarios discussed 
in Section 2, the postulate is somewhat of an overkill because it does compromise 
propositional beliefs. In particular, the postulate says that accommodating an evidence 
CY should totally wash out a previous evidence ,U whenever lu. contradicts a in the 
light of P. But this does not always constitute enough grounds for evidence a to 
undermine an earlier evidence p because the source of contradiction may lie with P 
not with ,u. 
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Example 12. We encounter a strange new animal and it appears to be a bird, so we 
believe the animal is a bird. As it comes closer to our hiding place, we see clearly that 
the animal is red, so we believe that it is a red bird. To remove further doubts about the 
animal birdness, we call in a bird expert who takes it for examination and concludes 
that it is not really a bird but some sort of mammal. The question now is whether we 
should still believe that the animal is red. Postulate (CB) tells us that we should no 
longer believe that the animal is red. This can be seen by substituting 1v‘ = la = bird 
and ,u = red in postulate (CB), instructing us to totally ignore the color observation ,LL 
as if it never took place (see Example A.5 in Appendix A for more details). 
The reason for this behavior is that retaining the belief in the animal’s color means 
that we are implicitly acquiring a new conditional belief-that the animal is red given 
that it is not a bird-which we did not have before. That is, if before observing the 
animal’s color someone were to ask us, “Would you say that the animal is red, given that 
it is not a bird?’ our answer would have been, “No, because we are not in possession of 
any color information”. Strangely, according to the minimal-change principle, we should 
maintain this same color ignorance now that the red animal proved to be a non-bird. 
The fact that we actually observed the animal’s redness prior to calling the expert does 
not matter, as it only pertains to our belief set during that observation; namely, it renders 
the animal red, provided the animal is a bird, but says nothing about the animal’s color 
if it turns out to be a non-bird. 
This is counterintuitive; once the animal is seen red, it should be presumed red 
no matter what ornithological classification it obtains. And if this belief preservation 
introduces new conditional beliefs, so be it. 
5. Postulates for iterated revision 
We have presented a number of belief revision scenarios that involve counterintuitive 
changes in conditional beliefs, and yet they are admitted by the AGM postulates for 
belief revision. This means that the AGM postulates fail to rule out some counterintuitive 
belief revision operators. We have also shown that although postulate (CB) does preserve 
conditional beliefs, it also leads to counterintuitive results because it often compromises 
propositional beliefs while protecting conditional ones. 
Our solution to the problem is to divide conditional beliefs into two categories; those 
that may compromise propositional beliefs if preserved, and those that do not. We then 
insist that only the second category of conditional beliefs be preserved, and we do this 
by proposing additional postulates. In fact, for clarity of exposition, we break down the 
conditional beliefs we want to preserve into four classes and propose one postulate for 
preserving each class. 
We first present these postulates, and then discuss the reason why they do not com- 
promise propositional beliefs as does postulate (CB) . That these postulates correspond 
to four disjoint classes of conditional beliefs will be obvious from the representation 
theorem of these postulates, which we present later. Conditional beliefs whose protection 
compromises propositional beliefs are the subject of Section 7. 
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The proposed postulates are: 
(Cl) Ifa~=,then(~o~)o~u_oo. 
Explanation: when two pieces of evidence arrive, the second being more specific 
than the first, the first is redundant; that is, the second evidence alone would 
yield the same belief set. One can also phrase this postulate as (p o a) o (o A 
,u) z q o (cy A ,u) with the interpretation that learning full information should 
wash out any previously learned partial information [ 181. 
(C2) If a t= l,u, then (ly o ,u) o a E p o LY. 
Explanation: when two contradictory pieces of evidence arrive, the last one 
prevails; that is, the second evidence alone would yield the same belief set. 
(C3) If p o LX k ,u, then (F o y) o LY b p. 
Explanation: an evidence ,LL should be retained after accommodating a more 
recent evidence (Y that implies /_L given current beliefs. 
(C4) If 1v 11 (Y k 1~~ then (Y’ o ,u) o CY k 1,~. 
Explanation: no evidence can contribute to its own demise. If ,u is not contra- 
dicted after seeing a, then it should remain uncontradicted when (Y is preceded 
by ,LL itself. 
By examining the postulates carefully, we see that none of them does lead to the 
unnecessary discredit of evidence. In particular, according to postulate (C 1)) the later 
evidence cy could never discredit the previous evidence ,u because LY entails p. Pos- 
tulate (C2), on the other hand, permits the later evidence cz to discredit the previ- 
ous evidence p but justifiably so; LY logically contradicts ,u. Postulate (C3) clearly 
insists that the previous evidence ,U be retained after accommodating the more re- 
cent evidence a. And postulate (C4) concerns a case under which the previous ev- 
idence p should not be contradicted as a result of accommodating the more recent 
evidence (Y. 
Postulates (Cl )-( C4) were phrased in terms of iterated revisions, but following is an 
equivalent formulation, in terms of conditional beliefs using Definition 6, that highlights 
the change-minimization role of these postulates: 
(Cl) Ifa~~,then~~~pl(Yifflyo~u~plcu. 
Explanation: accommodating evidence ,U should not perturb any conditional 
beliefs that are conditioned on a premise more specific than ,u. 
(C2) Ifa~-~,thenly~~plc-uifflyo~u~picu. 
Explanation: accommodating evidence ,u should not perturb any conditional 
beliefs that are conditioned on a premise that contradicts p. 
(C3) If~~,u\/,thenlyo,u+~l~. 
Explanation: the conditional ,U ( (Y should not be given up after accommodating 
evidence ,u. 
(C4) If~~~~~~,then~o~~~~~~. 
Explanation: the conditional 7~ 1 a should not be acquired after accommodating 
evidence p. 
Appendix A presents four AGM-compatible revision operators that contradict each of 
our proposed postulates, thus demonstrating that none of (Cl )-(C4) is derivable from 
the AGM postulates. In the following section, we provide concrete real-life scenarios 
demonstrating the plausibility of the proposed postulates. 
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5. I. Examples 
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Postulate (C 1) 
I have a circuit containing an adder and a multiplier. I believe both the adder and 
multiplier are working, hence the circuit as a whole is working. If someone were to tell 
me that the circuit failed, I would blame the multiplier, not the adder (trick of the trade: 
multipliers are known to be more troublesome). However, if someone tells me that the 
adder is bad, I would believe that the multiplier is fine (because failures are presumed 
independent, so, two simultaneous failures are much less likely that one). Now, they tell 
me the circuit is faulty, and immediately after, that the adder is bad. Should I be tempted 
to claim that the multiplier is bad too? A naive argument: “After hearing of the fault in 
the circuit I blamed the multiplier. Learning that the adder is bad is perfectly consistent 
with my current belief that the multiplier is bad, therefore, I have no reason to change 
my mind about the multiplier being bad.” Plausible reasoning (and postulate (C 1) ) on 
the other hand claim that I should change my mind because the only reason I blamed the 
multiplier was to explain the failing circuit. Otherwise, by my own admission, I would 
presume the multiplier is fine. Moreover, I also admitted that the two components do not 
affect each other. Hence, learning that the adder is bad perfectly explains away whatever 
reasons I had in blaming the multiplier; I should revert to my initial belief that the 
multiplier is fine. Postulate (Cl) enforces this line of reasoning. In particular, by letting 
p f adder-ok A multiplier-ok, 
p = 7 (adder-ok A multiplierok), 
a = Tadder_ok, 
/I = multiplierok, 
one can conclude that (W o ,u) o (Y + /? using postulate (Cl) and given (Y /= ,U and 
p o CY + p. The AGM postulates, however, are too weak to draw such a conclusion, as 
demonstrated by Example A.1 in Appendix A. 
Postulate (C2) 
Consider Example 5 in Section 2: I believe that lady X is smart and rich. Moreover, 
I am disposed to maintain that X is smart even if found to be poor and, conversely, that 
X is rich even if found to be not smart. Now, I obtain evidence that X is in fact not 
smart, followed by evidence that X is indeed smart. What should happen to my belief 
in X being rich after accommodating these pieces of evidence? Postulate (C2) forces 
one to maintain this belief. Specifically, by letting 
?? z smart A rich, 
p = Tsmart, 
(Y = smart, 
j3 = rich, 
one can conclude that (p o ,u) o a /= p using postulate (C2) and given that (Y b 7~ 
and W o cy b j?. Example A.2 in Appendix A, however, demonstrates that the AGM 
postulates are too weak to reach this conclusion. 
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Postulate (C3) 
Consider Example 4 in Section 2: I believe that X is not a bird and that X does not fly. 
Still, in the event that X turns out a bird, I am prepared to change my mind and conclude 
that X flies. What should happen to this conditional belief upon observing that X can 
fly? Postulate (C3) forces one to maintain this conditional belief after accommodating 
the observation. That is, by letting 
p E -bird A +ies, 
p =$ies, 
a = bird. 
one can conclude that (F o ,u) o LY k ,U using postulate (C3) and given p o a k p. 
Example A.3 in Appendix A, however, demonstrates that the AGM postulates are too 
weak to draw this conclusion. 
Postulate (C4) 
A philosopher wakes up in the morning and says: “The sun is shining, great!, I have 
no reason to believe that it will be a nasty day”. His wife tells him: “In fact, just before 
you woke up they said on the radio that it is going to be a nice day”. The philosopher 
says: “Did they really say that? They are usually right on the radio, I will have to take it 
back then, it is going to be nasty after all”. Readers who feel there is something strange 
in this dialogue will be pleased to know that postulate ((24) will weed out this sort of 
logic from conversation. In particular, letting 
T 3 -shining-sun, 
or. = nice-day, 
CY = shining-sun, 
one can conclude that (p o ,u) o QI p 7~ using postulate (C4) and given that 1v o LY /+ 
1~. In other words, the philosopher’s final statement is inconsistent with postulate (C4). 
Example A.4 in Appendix A, however, demonstrates that the AGM postulates are too 
weak to rule out such a statement. 
5.2. A representation theorem 
Theorem 9 shows that a revision operator satisfying the modified AGM postulates is 
equivalent to a set of total pre-orders f,, each of which is associated with an epistemic 
state 9 and is used to revise this state in the face of further evidence. One observation 
about this result, however, is that the total pre-orders associated with different epistemic 
states are not related to one another except by requiring that the pre-orders be faithful. 
This explains the permissiveness of the AGM postulates regarding some changes in 
conditional beliefs when evidence is accommodated. Postulates (Cl)-(C4), on the 
other hand, which strongly constrain such changes, should also strongly constrain the 
relationship between the pre-orders 6~ and <byte. This is exactly what the following 
theorem shows: 
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Theorem 13. Suppose that a revision operator satis$es postulates (R* I )-( R*6). The 
operator satis$es postulates (C 1) - (C4) iff the operator and its corresponding faithful 
assignment satis&: 
(CR]) If 01 k P and ~2 i= ,K then WI 6~ w iff w GOP ~2. 
(CR2) lfot /= 7,~ and w2 /= 7,x, then WI <p w2 iff tiI <vrOP 012. 
(CR3) If WI l= ,u an d w2 k ~,u, then WI <P w2 only if w1 <voF 02. 
(CR4) Ifwl /= ,U and w2 /= up, then WI 6~ wz only ifwl <POP 0.9. 
By examining the above representation theorem, we see how each of postulates (Cl ) - 
(C4) concerns itself with preserving some part of the pre-order <v, into the pre-order 
< ,woPL. It is also clear from the above theorem that there are two parts of the pre-order 
<p that postulates (Cl)-(C4) do not preserve into GllrO+. Specifically, if WI G1/, w2 
(or WI <v (ox), where WI k 1,~ and ~2 /= ,u, then the postulates do not insist on 
01 GOP w2 (nor on WI <h+ 0~2). The rationale behind this will be discussed at length 
in Section 7. 
6. Properties of iterated revision postulates 
We provide in this section a concrete revision operator that satisfies postulates (R* 1) - 
(R*6) and postulates (C I) -( C4), thus proving their consistency. The operator is based 
on a proposal by Spohn for revising ordinal conditionalfunctions, which can be viewed 
as representations of epistemic states [ 8,22-241. Spohn’s method for belief change, 
called (,u, m)-conditionalization, can be interpreted as a qualitative version of Jeffrey’s 
rule of probabilistic conditioning [ 8, 11, 121. Using a dynamic version of Spohn condi- 
tionalization, we will construct a revision operator l that satisfies all our postulates, thus 
showing that the postulates we propose for characterizing iterated belief revision, in ad- 
dition to being consistent, are also compatible with a qualitative version of probabilistic 
conditioning. 
An ordinal conditional function (ranking) is a function K from a given set of worlds 
into the class of ordinals such that some worlds are assigned the smallest ordinal 0. Intu- 
itively, the ordinals represent degrees of plausibility. The smallest the ordinal, the more 
plausible a world is. A ranking is extended to propositions by requiring that the rank of 
a proposition by the smallest rank assigned to a world that satisfies the propositions: 
This also implies that 
A ranking accepts a proposition p if the negation of the proposition is implausible: 
K( 1,~) > 0. One can characterize the set of propositions accepted by a ranking, denoted 
Bel( K), as follows: 
Mods(Bel(K)) Ef (0: K(W) = O}. 
Any sentence that has the set of O-rank worlds as its models is a characterization of 
these accepted propositions, that is, K accepts /_L precisely when Be/(K) k ,u. 
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One property of ranking functions is that Bel( K) is guaranteed to be satisfiable since 
at least one world must be assigned the O-rank by K. This does not admit epistemic 
states with unsatisfiable belief sets, which is a restriction when viewed in light of 
postulate (R*l). Specifically, if we accept this postulate, we cannot allow revisions 
with an unsatisfiable ,u because this should lead to an unsatisfiable belief set according 
to (R*l). Therefore, we will relax the assumption that at least one world has the O-rank, 
and will permit rankings K with unsatisfiable belief sets Bel(~). 
In addition to proposing rankings as a representation of epistemic states, Spohn 
proposed a method for changing a ranking in face of new evidence. Specifically, evidence 
is represented as a pair (,u, m), where f_~ is a proposition and m is the post-revision 
degree of plausibility of ,u. A rank K is updated in face of such evidence as follows: 
K(p,n~) (@) = 
K(W) - K(P), if w + pu; 
K(W) - K(l,U) + m, if W k l/L 
Spohn called K(~,,,,) the (,u, m) -conditionalization of K. 
One feature of ( ,u, m)-conditionalization is that /_L ends up with a rank of m regardless 
of its pre-update rank K( pu>. By letting m be a function of K( ,u) a wide variety of belief 
revision schemes can be synthesized. To construct our belief revision operator l we will 
choose one such scheme, ensuring that a revision by p will always strengthen the belief 
in p. 7 Specifically, we let m, the post-revision degree of plausibility of p, be one degree 
higher than its current value, K( 1,~): 
Note that if ,u is unsatisfiable, the belief set of K l ,u will also be unsatisfiable. 
The following theorem shows that the proposed postulates are satisfied by Spohn’s 
proposal for belief change (restricted to revision scenarios). 
Theorem 14. The revision operator l satisfies postulates (R* 1 )-( R*6) and (C l)- 
(C4). 
This theorem also shows that the iterated revision postulates we have proposed are 
consistent with the modified AGM postulates in which belief revision is a function of 
an epistemic state instead of a belief set. * 
’ Clearly, other updating schemes will also suit our purpose; for example, leaving K(,u) unaltered whenever 
,U is already believed, or incrementing K(P) by a number which measures the strength of evidence for p, in 
the spirit of L-conditionalization [ I3 ] 
x It is commonly believed that Spohn’s conditionalization provides a successful realization of ACM-style 
revision. Glrdenfors, for example, claims in 18, p. 73 I : “. let us define the belief set K cls.rociute~I with 
the ordinal conditional function K as the set of all propositions that are accepted in K. If we let Ki denote 
the belief set associated with K* (A, cl), where (I > 0, then it can be shown that the revision function defined 
in this way satisfies postulates (K* I )-( K*8) .” This is not in fact the case; Gardenfors construction requires 
that operator * not be a function since different ordinal functions K can have the same associated belief sets, 
thus violating the basic tenet of the original AGM framework. 
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Lehmann has shown that the AGM postulates together with postulate (C 1) are suff- 
cient to imply postulates (C3) and (C4) [ 181 .9 The following theorem shows that this 
result is only valid in light of postulate (R4), which requires belief revisions to depend 
only on the current belief set. If revisions are a function of the current epistemic state 
(as in (R* 1) -( R*6) ), then postulates (C3) and (C4) are independent of (C 1) : 
Theorem 15. There is u revision operator that satisfies postulates (R*l )-(R*6) and 
(C 1) , bur does not satisfy postulate (C3) or (C4). 
7. Legitimate changes in conditional beliefs 
Given Theorem 13, it is not hard to see that postulate (CB) implies, but is not 
equivalent to, postulates (C 1) -(C4). Therefore, postulates (Cl ) -(C4) do admit some 
changes in conditional beliefs. What are these changes and why are they legitimate? 
To answer these questions, we show that adding the following two postulates to 
postulates (Cl)-(C4) will lead to absolute minimization of changes in conditional 
beliefs: 
(C5) Ifly.p+ icy and p o LY k p, then (q o ,x) o cy k ,u. 
Explanation: if evidence p rules out the premise cy, then the conditional belief 
p / a should not be acquired after observing p. 
(C6) Iflyo,u+ x! and 1v o cy + 7,x, then (p o ,x) o CY b 7,~. 
Explanation: if evidence /.L rules out the premise a, then the conditional belief 
1,~ / a should not be given up after observing CL. 
That postulates (C5) and (C6) attain absolute minimal change in conditional beliefs can 
be seen from the following representation theorem, which, together with Theorem 13, 
shows that the total pre-order <qOp is as similar to the total pre-order <p as the AGM 
postulates permit. 
Theorem 16. Suppose that a revision operator satisjes postulates (R* 1) -( R*6). The 
operator satisfies postulates (C5) and (C6) iJrs the operator and its corresponding 
faithful assignment sati&: 
(CR5) If WI, w3 b p and 012 /= 7,~ then w1 <W WI and w2 <W WI only if 
w2 GqL WI. 
The remaining changes in conditional beliefs that are not eliminated by postu- 
lates (Cl )-(C4) are those identified by postulates (C5)-( C6). The first of these 
changes is acquiring a conditional belief /J 1 a only because evidence ,x was acquired. 
And the second of these changes is giving up a conditional belief 7,~ 1 a only because 
evidence p was acquired. Postulates (C5) -(C6), and also postulate (CB), eliminate 
these changes, but the following analysis shows that such elimination is premature. 
y That is, when (Cl ), (C3) and (C4) are phrased using belief sets instead of epistemic states. 
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To show that postulate (‘3) can prohibit some legitimate changes, consider Exam- 
ple 12, which was presented as counterexample to postulate (CB). This example is a 
clear cut contradiction with postulate ((3) because it shows that the revision suggested 
by postulate (C5) is wrong: All we believe initially is that X is a bird. We then observe 
that X is red, followed by an observation that X is not a bird. Postulate (C5) tells us that 
we should dismiss the observation of X’s color in this case. That is, since the conditional 
red / -bird was not believed by the belief set bird, it should neither be believed by the 
new belief set bird o red. But this falsely means that when lbird is observed, red must 
be retracted, which is a counterintuitive behavior. 
To show that postulate (C6) prohibits some legitimate changes in conditional beliefs, 
consider the following example. 
Example 17. We face a murder trial with two main suspects, John and Mary. Initially, 
it appears that the murder was committed by one person. hence, we believe that 
9 E (John A ~Mury) V (-John A Mary). 
Given the AGM postulates, we also believe in the two conditionals ~Mury 1 John and 
TJohn j Mary. As the trial unfolds, however, we receive a very reliable testimony 
incriminating John, followed by another reliable testimony incriminating Mary. At this 
point, it is only reasonable to believe that both suspects took part in the murder, thus 
dismissing the one-person theory together with the two conditional beliefs ‘Mary 1 John 
and TJuhn 1 Mm-y. Postulate (C6), on the other hand, will force us to maintain the 
two conditionals and dismiss the testimony against John, no matter how compelling. 
That is, by substituting (Y = Mary and /_L = John, postulate (C6) forces the conclusion 
(p o John) o Mary k 1John given that p o John k -‘Mary and W o Mary k TJohn. 
This is counterintuitive; whether we should dismiss the testimony against John should 
depend on how strongly we believe in it compared with how strongly we believe 
in the one-person theory. Postulate (C6), however, does not take these factors into 
consideration and always prefers the conditional belief over the propositional one. 
8. Future work 
The counterexamples to postulates (C5) and (C6) that we discussed in Section 7 
show that the outcome of belief change depends on the strength of evidence triggering 
the change. The language of AGM, however, is too weak to represent evidence strength 
and is therefore inappropriate for phrasing some plausible properties of belief change, 
such as qualified versions of postulates (CS) and (C6). 
To remedy this inexpressiveness, we have been investigating the refinement of revision 
operators so that one can express the strength of evidence with which one is revising 
beliefs. In particular, instead of one revision operator 0, we are investigating a sequence 
of revision operators 00, or, 02,. ., where ~o,,,,u denotes the revision of p with evidence 
J.L having strength m. 
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The notion of evidence strength leads us to another important notion: degree oi 
acceptance. Specifically, we will say that proposition CL is accepted by Y to degree m 
if it takes an evidence -p with strength m to retract p from p. Farmally, we have the 
following definition. 
Definition 18. Proposition p is accepted by an epistemic state p to degree m (written 
p j=-,,, ,u) precisely when 
( 1) w F 16 
(2) ~‘o,,r 7,~ F 7,~; and 
(3) p %? TP p /.L. 
This refinement to the AGM language is intended to allow expressing qualified ver- 
sions of postulate (C5) and (C6) by taking into account the degrees to which condi- 
tional beliefs are accepted and the strength of competing evidence. Moreover, the refined 
language allows one to express stronger versions of postulates (Cl )-( C4) that insist 
on the selective preservation of not only conditional beliefs, but also their degrees of 
acceptance. 
9. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that adequate preservation of conditional beliefs is a necessary 
component in any account of rational belief revision, and that such preservation must 
be applied at the epistemic state, rather than belief set level. The AGM postulates 
are inadequate for regulating iterated belief revision because they apply to belief sets 
and, even when broadened to accommodate epistemic state revision, they remain too 
weak-two-step postulates are necessary. We have also shown that full, indiscriminate 
preservation of conditional beliefs leads to counterintuitive results because it comes at 
the expense of compromising propositional beliefs. 
Accordingly, we have proposed an epistemic state version of the AGM framework, 
together with four additional postulates that preserve the proper mix of conditional 
and propositional beliefs. The resulting system provides a new criterion for testing the 
coherence of iterated belief revision. Finally, we extended the Katsuno and Mendelzon 
representation theorem of the AGM postulates to cover the newly proposed postulates. 
Acknowledgments 
Preliminary draft of this paper has been presented at the 1994 conference on Theo- 
retical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge [ 51. Daniel Lehmann and Rohit Parikh 
have pointed out that (C2) clashes with the AGM postulates. Isaac Levi observed that 
the clash results from the AGM requirement that revision be a function of the belief 
set. We have benefitted substantially from discussions with Isaac Levi, Craig Boutilier, 
Horatio Ar16 Costa, Nir Friedman, and from extensive comments by an anonymous 
reviewer. Funding was provided in part by NSF grant # IRI-9420306, AFOSR grant 
# 94-l-0173, and MICRO grant # 95-118. 
A. Darwiclze, .I. Pearl/Artificial Intelii~ence 89 (I 997) 1-29 19 
Table A.1 
An AGM-compatible operator contradicting postulate ( C 1) 
world addernk multiplier_ok 
WI T T 
w2 T F 
w F T 
04 F F 
Table A.2 
An AGM-compatible operator contradicting postulate (C2) 
world smart rich 
WI T T 
W? T F 
?I F T 
w4 F F 
6T <%p 
0 2 
I I 
I 0 
2 I 
Appendix A. Concrete examples 
We will represent a total pre-order <P by a mapping K from worlds to positive 
integers, where wr <V 1x2 precisely when K(WI > < K( ~2). 
Example A.1 (Postulate (Cl ) ) . Consider the AGM revision operator given partially 
in Table A. 1. Let 
F z adder-ok A multiplierok, 
p, = T(adderok A multipliersk) , 
a = -adder-ok. 
Although cy k CL, we have 
p o CY E Tadder_ok A multiplierok, 
(W o p) o a E Tadder_ok A Tmultiplier_ok, 
thus violating postulate (Cl), which requires that P o a E (P o p) o LY. 
Moreover, ~3, ~4 I= P, ~3 6 ~4, yet ~3 ~YI~+ ~4, thus violating condition (CR1 ) 
Example A.2 (Postulate (C2) > . Consider the AGM revision operator given partially 
in Table A.2. Let 
W E smart A rich, 
p = -smart, 
cy = smart. 
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Table A.3 
An AGM-compatible operator contradicting postulate (C3) 
world bird Pies <P 
WI T T 2 
w2 T F 3 
w3 F T I 
w4 F F 0 
6WqL 
I 
I 
0 
I 
Table A.4 
An AGM-compatible operator contradicting postulate (C4) 
world shiningsun niceday 
WI T T 
w2 T F 
W? F T 
04 F F 
Although LY /= ~,u, we have 
F o cx F smart A rich, 
(~O,U)OCY-smartAvich, 
thus violating postulate (C2), which requires that P o a s (P o ,u) o (Y. 
Moreover, WI ,w2 /= ~,u, WI <lo ~2, yet WI $lyOIL ~2, thus violating condition 
(CR2). 
Example A.3 (Postulate (C3)). Consider the AGM revision operator given partially 
in Table A.3. Let 
P E Third A +ies, 
p =jlies, 
LY = bird. 
We have. 
!P o (Y E bird AJlies, 
(P o ,u) o CY z bird. 
That is, although P 0 (Y /= ,u, we have (P 0 ,u) o cy j& ,u, thus violating postulate (~3). 
Moreover, WI k ,x, 02 b ~,u, WI <Y’ ~2, yet WI ~~~~ ~2, thus violating condition 
(CR3). 
Example A.4 (Postulate (C4) ) . Consider the AGM revision operator given partially 
in Table A.4. Let 
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Yr z lshiningsun, 
iu = niceday, 
LY = shiningsun. 
We have, 
ly o (Y E shiningsun, 
(p o ,u) o a E shining-sun A lniceday. 
That is, although P OLY F 7~~ we have (P 0,~) ocy k up, thus violating postulate (C4). 
Moreover, 01 k ,u, 02 k up, WI 61~ ~2, yet WI ~~~~ ~2, thus violating condition 
(CR4). 
Example A.5 (Postulate (CB) ) . Let 
W z bird, 
,u = red, 
a = Third. 
and assume that P o -bird E lbird. Substituting in postulate (CB), we get 
if q 0 red b bird, then (W o red) o Third E 9 o -bird. 
Given the AGM postulates, this implies 
(p 0 red) o -bird E p o -bird. 
Given our assumption, this reduces to 
(p 0 red) o Third z -bird, 
which is a counterintuitive conclusion. 
Appendix B. Proofs 
Proof of Theorem 9 
This proof is symmetric to the one provided by Katsuno and Mendelzon for Theo- 
rem 3.3 in [ 171. We also use the notationfomz( WI, ~2,. .) to denote a sentence LY that 
has 0~1,012,. . as its models: Mods(a) = {WI, 02,. . .}. 
(+) Suppose that a revision operator o satisfies postulates (R*l )-( R*6), For each 
epistemic state !P, define its corresponding total pre-order <P as follows: 
w <qt ii/ 
def 
= w t= P or 0 b P oform(w,w’). 
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The binary relation <y, is a total p-e-order: 
(1) Total: By (R*3), Mods(F o form(w,w’)) is a non-empty set. By (R*l), 
Mods(P o form(w, w’) ) is a subset of {w, w’}. Therefore, for any w and w’, 
either w k ?P oform(w,w’) or w’ /= P oform(w,w’). Therefore, GP is total. 
(2) Rejexive: By (R*l) and (R*3), Mods(Poform(w)) = {w}. Therefore, w <,,, w 
and <,,v is reflexive. 
(3) Transitive: Suppose that WI <,,Y 02 and w2 <,,o ~3. We need to show that 
WI 6~~ wg. We consider three cases: 
(1) WI /==. 
01 <p w3 follows from the definition of <y,. 
(2) 01 k P and w2 + P. 
Since Mods(P Aform(wl,w:!)) = {wz}, then Mods(P oform(wl,w2)) = 
(~2) by (R*2). Hence, WI do 0~2 follows given that WI k ?P. This is a 
contradiction, which means the case is impossible. 
(3) WI k P and w2 p W. 
We have two subcases: 
(1) Mods(ly~oform(~,,w2,~~)) = (~3). 
By setting ,u to form(wl, 02, ~3) and C$ to form(w2,uj) in (R*5) 
and (R*6), we obtain 
Mods(~oforrn(wl,w:!,w3)) n{w~,q} 
=Mods(P oform(w2,w3)). 
Hence, Mods(Poform(w2, ~3)) = (~3) and w2 $Y, w3 since WI p W. 
A contradiction, which means the case is impossible. 
(2) Mods(Poform(wl,wz,w3)) + (~3). 
Since WI <O wz and WI &t P, we have WI /= P oform(wl,w2). 
By setting ,U to form(wl,w2,wg) and 4 to form(wl,w2) in (R*5) 
and (R*6), we obtain 
Modst~oform(wl,w2,w3)) n{w1,~2} 
=Mods(Poform(w~,w2)). 
Hence, WI ~Poform(wl,w~,w~).Bysetting,~~ toform(wl,w2,~3) 
and 4 to form( w,, ~3) in (R*5) and (R*6), we also obtain 
Mods(P oform(wl,w2,w3)) n {w~,wj} 
= Mods(!P oform(wl,w3)). 
Hence, WI + ?P oform(wl,w3). Therefore, WI 6~ ~3. 
The assignment mapping P to <V is faithful: 
(1) wt,w2 b!P only if wt =Y ~2. 
Follows immediately from the definition of <v. 
(2) WI + P and w2 p P only if wt <v ~2. 
Suppose that WI b ly and w2 p P. Then Mods(P oform(wl,o2)) = {WI} 
follows from (R*2). Therefore, WI <V w2 and w2 $Jv WI. 
(3) W = @ only if <p=&. 
Follows immediately from the definitions of <p and <o and from (R*4). 
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The equality Mods(!P 0 p) = min( Mods( p) , &P) holds: 
Follows immediately when p is not satisfiable. Suppose that /.L is satisfiable. 
l Mods(?P o p) C min(Mods(p), <q). 
Suppose that w + P o ,U and w $ min( Mods( p), <g). We will prove a contradic- 
tion. Given the supposition, we must have w’ k p where w’ <q w. 
(1) w’/=P. 
P A p is satisfiable and, by (R*2), P o p = P A ,u. Therefore, w k V’ since 
w + P o ,u. This leads to w <t w’ which is a contradiction. 
(2) CO’ + P ofom(o,w’) and u /+L ?P oform(w,w’>. 
By (R*5) and pAform(w,w’) cform(w,w’), we have 
Mods(P o ,u) n { w,w’} i Mods(P oform(w,w’)). 
Since w F P oform( w, w’), we conclude w p 1v 0 p, which is a contradiction. 
l min(Mods(p)), <v) c Mods(P 0 p). 
Suppose that o E min(Mods(p) , <v) and w p P o ,u. We will prove a contradic- 
tion. Since ,u is satisfiable, there must exist LO’ such that w’ + P o p by (R*3). 
By (R*5) and (R*6) and since p Aform(o,w’) =form(w, w’), we have 
Mods(Pop) nform(w,w’) =Mods(Poform(w,w’)). 
Since w’ b ly o p and w k P o J_L, we have Mods(!P oform(w, w’)) = {w’}. Since 
w + min( Mods( p) , <y ), we also have u <V 0’. Given that w k Poform( w, w’), 
w + P. Therefore, w k P o ,U follows from (R*2), which is a contradiction. 
(+=) Suppose that a faithful assignment exists which maps each epistemic state q to 
a total pre-order <v such that 
Mods(Pop) =min(Mods(,u),<~). 
(R*l) W o ,X implies p. 
Follows immediately from the definition of o. 
(R*2) If W A p is satisfiable, then V o p = P A p. 
It suffices to show that if Mods(P A p) is not empty, then Mods(P o p) = 
Mods(P A p). Suppose that Mods(P A p) is not empty. 
l Mods(P o ,u) 2 Mods(P A/L). 
Suppose that w k P o JA and w p P A ,u. Then o b ,u and w k ty. 
Moreover, there must exist w’ b !P A p and w’ <p w by properties of 
faithful assignments. Therefore, w cannot be minimal in Mods(p) under 
<yP, which is a contradiction with u b P o p. 
l Mods( P A p) 2 Mods( P o /AU). 
Suppose that w k P A p. Then w must be minimal in Mods( ,u) under <,,, 
by properties of faithful assignments. Hence, w E min(Mods(p), &,) = 
Mods(P O/A). 
(R*3) If ,U is satisfiable, then P o p is also satisfiable. 
Follows immediately from the definition of o. 
(R*4) If ?Pi = !P2 and ~1 3 J_L~, then Pi o ,ui E 92 o J.Q. 
Follows immediately from the definition of o and properties of faithful assign- 
ments. 
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(R*5) (q o ,u) A $J implies V o (,u A $). 
Suppose that w /= (p 0 ,u) A 4 and w k !JJ 0 (,u A 4). Then w /z= ,U A 4 and 
there must exist w’ /= ,u A 4 where w’ <O w. Therefore, w cannot be minimal 
in Mods under +, which is a contradiction. 
(R*6) If (W o ,u) A 4 is satisfiable, then ly o (,u A 4) implies (p o ,u) A 4. 
Suppose that (pop)A$~ is satisfiable, w /= po(,~A+), and o F (po,~)l\+. 
Since w b 4, we have w /# p o ,u. Given that (3lr o ,u) A 4 is satisfiable, there 
must exist some w’ /= (pop) r\4 and w’ /= ,~uA4. This implies w <lu w’ since 
w + !,Q o ( ,U A 4). Given that w’ b p o ,u, we have w’ E min (Mods( p) , &,, ) 
Therefore, u E min(Mods(p), <v) and w /= ly o ,u. A contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem II 
(+> Suppose that (CB) holds. Assume WI, 04 k -( Po,u). We want to show wl &, 
w2 iff WI <pocL ~2. Let (Y be such that Mods(a) = {WI, up}. Then LY /= ~(p o ,u), 
po,u /= icy and (~o,u)o(Y E ~OCY by postulate (CB). Hence, min({wi,wz}, Gqoy) = 
min({wl, w}, 6~ > and w <V w iff w Go+ q. 
(de) Suppose that (CBR) holds. Assume W o ,U /= la. We want to show p o a z 
(W o p) o (Y. We have LY /= -J(W o p). Moreover, <p and <pofi are identical on their 
subdomains MO&(-(V o ,u)> x MO&( ~(9 o p)). Therefore, min(Mo&(cr), <,,,) = 
min(hlods(a), 6~~~) and p o LY = (p o pu) o a. 
Proof of Theorem 13 
( 1) Postulate (Cl) is equivalent to (CRl). 
(+> Suppose that (CRl) holds. Assume & k ,u. We want to show that 
W 0 cy = (p 0 ,u) o (Y. Condition (CR1 ) implies that <I and <pop are equivalent 
on their subdomain Mods(a) x Mods(~) since LY /= p. Hence, 
Mods(~oc-u) =min(a,,<v) 
(e) Suppose that (Cl ) holds. Assume WJ , (~‘2 /= ,u. We want to show wi 6~~ 
~2 iff w GOP ~2. Let 1y be such that Mods(cu) = {wi,w2}. Then a b ,u 
and 3v o LY E (p o ,u) o a by postulate (Cl). Hence, min({wi,wz}, 6~) = 
min({wi,w2}, <vQ~) and ~1 6~ ~2 iff WI <V~~ ~2. 
(2) Postulate (C2) is equivalent to (CR2). 
Proof is symmetric with the one above. 
(3) Postulate (C3) is equivalent to (CR3). 
(+) Suppose that (CR3) holds. Assume p o (Y /= ,u. We want to show that 
(w‘ o ,u) o cy /= cc. By Lemma 10, there exists w b LY A p such that w <e w’ for 
any w’ b (Y A 1,~. Therefore, by condition (CR3), there exists w b (Y A ,U such 
that w <poilL w’ for any w’ k a A 1~. Hence, by Lemma 10, (ly o ,u) 0 a b ,u. 
(4) 
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(x=) Suppose that (C3) holds. Assume 01 /= ,u, w:! /= 1~ and 01 <q ~2. 
We want to show WI <pop ~2. Let cz be such that MO&( cz) = { wt , ~2). Then 
p o (Y + p by Lemma 10 since wt k LY A J_L, WI <y w2 and Mods(a A 1,~) = 
(~2). Then (q o pu> o Q k p by postulate (C3). Moreover, WI <pO& ~2 by 
Lemma 10 since Mods(a A /A) = {WI} and Mods(a A 7~) = (~2). 
Postulate (C4) is equivalent to (CR4). 
( +) Suppose that (CR4) holds. Assume (p 0~) o a /= 7~. We want to show 
?P0(v+=p. lo By Lemma 10, there exists w + a: A 7~ such that w cqofi w’ 
for all o’ /= LY A p. Moreover, by the contrapositive of condition (CR4), there 
exists w + (Y A 1~ such that w <V w’ for all w’ + ct A CL. Hence, by Lemma 10, 
we have p o cy k 7~. 
(+) Suppose that (C4) holds. Assume WI + ,u, 02 b 1,~ and w2 <pop wt. 
We want to show w2 <y, wt. ” Let cy be such that Mods(a) = {wI,w~}. 
Then (9 o ,u) o (Y k 7~ by Lemma 10 since w2 k a A up, w2 <poF 01 and 
Mods(LuAp) = {WI}. Then Focu k 7~ by postulate (C4). Moreover, w2 <p WI 
by Lemma 10 since Muds(cu A 1~) = {WI} and Mods(a A p) = {WI}. 
Lemma B.l. Let the total pre-order of a ranking K be defined as follows: 
W1 6, W2 dzfK(W~) < K(W2). 
We then have 
Mods(Bel(Kop)) =min(Mods(p),<,), 
and 
(I) wl,w2 +Bel(K) only if wI =K w2. 
(2) WI + Bel(K) and 02 k -Bel(K) only if w1 <x.P ~2.. 
(3) K’ = K2 Only if <,I=+. 
Here, WI cK w2 is defined as 01 <, w:! and w2 & WI ; and w 1 =K 04 is dejined as 
WI <, w2 and w2 <, ~1. 
Proof. To show that Mods(Bel( K l p)) = min(Mods(p), <,), we show the follow- 
ing: 
l 
. 
If w k Bel(K l ,u) then w E min(Mods(p), <,). 
SUppOSe that w k Bel(K 0 pu>. Then (K l p) (w) = 0 by definition of Bel( K l ,u), 
and w /= p by definition of K l p. Moreover, (K l p) (w) = K(W) - K(p) = 0 and 
K(W) = K(p) = min,f+, K(w’). This implies that w GK w’ for all W’ k p and 
w E min(Mods(p),<,). 
If w E min(Mods(p), &) then w k Bel( K l p). 
Suppose that w E min(Mods(p), s&). Then w + Al. and w & w’ for all w’ + ,u. 
Moreover, K(W) < K(o’) for all w’ b p and, hence, K(W) = K(p). This implies 
that (K*,%)(W) =K(w) -K(P) =Oand, hence, w kBel(~op). 
“’ We are proving the contrapositive of postulate (C4). 
” We are proving the contrapositive of condition (CR4). 
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The rest of the lemma is shown as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
wl, w2 /= B&(K) only if WI =K ~2. 
Suppose that WI, w2 i= Bel(K). Then K(WI ) = ~(012) = 0 by definition of 
Bel( K). Therefore, 01 =K w2 by definition of =)(. 
WI /Abel and w2 j= -Be/(K) only if tin <K.P ~2. 
Suppose that WI k Be/(K) and w2 k -Be/(K). Then K(WI) = 0 and ~(0~2) > 0 
by definition of Bee. Therefore, WI <K,P w:! by definition of GK.&. 
K’ = K2 only if <,I =<,z. 
Follows immediately from the definitions of <<,I and +. 0 
Lemma B.2. Let GK and <K.l* be total pre-orders induced by rankings K and K l p. 
We then have: 
( 1) If WI b p and wz k p, then WI 6, w2 iff WI Gp 02. 
(2) ?fwl k 7~ and w i= Y, then WI GK 02 @WI Gp ~2. 
(3) If WI + p and q /= ~,u, then w1 cK w2 only if o] G.~ 02. 
(4) Ifwl /= ,u and wz /= 7~~ then WI 6, w? only if01 <K.fi ~2. 
Proof. 
(K”pU)(W) = ‘Qw(-p)t~)(W) = 
K(W) - K(P), if 6~ /= ,W 
KtWJ + , 
9 if w + 7~. 
Therefore, conditioning is a shifting process in which the ranks of worlds inside 
Mods(p) are all reduced by K(,u) and the ranks of worlds inside Mods( T,u) are 
all increased by 1. This implies the following: 
( 1) The relative order of worlds inside Mods( ,u) does not change. 
(2) The relative order of worlds inside Mods( 1,~) does not change. 
(3) If a world in Mods(p) had a lower rank than a world in Mods(lp) before the 
shifting, this will continue to be the case after the shifting. 
(4) It is impossible for a world in Mods( ,xu) to have a higher rank than a world in 
Mods(lp) after the shifting if it did not before the shifting. 
The four properties ( l)-(4) then hold. 0 
Proof of Theorem I4 
The fact that operator l satisfies postulates (R*l)-(R*6) follows immediately from 
Lemma B. 1 and Theorem 9. That it satisfies postulates (C 1) -( C4) follows immediately 
from Lemma B.2 and Theorem 13. 
Proof of Theorem 15 
The revision operator o is defined as follows: 
(KOl*.)(QJ) = 
I 
K(W) - K(p), if W + /G 
K(W) + 1, if w k ~/x, K(W) < 2; 
K(W) - 1, if w /= ‘/AU, K(W) > 2; 
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Table B. I 
A scenario that violates (C3) 
world K 
WI 0 I 0 I 
W? 3 0 3 0 
wi 4 I 3 0 
@A 0 I I 2 
Table B.2 
A scenario that violates (C4) 
world K 
WI 0 I 0 I 
K 3 0 3 I 
W? 3 0 2 0 
w‘l 0 1 I 2 
This operator is exactly like l except for one thing: it decrements the rank of every 
world inside Mods( 7,~) if the world’s rank is no less than 2. Therefore, the relative 
order of worlds inside Mo&( pu> is preserved, but other ordering relations (especially 
between worlds in Mods(p) and Mu&( T)(L) ) are purturbed. This causes the operator 
to violate Properties (2)) (3) and (4) of Lemma B.2, while continuing to satisfy ( 1) . 
Since operator o is equivalent to l for worlds inside Mods(p), Lemma B.l holds for 
o as well. Therefore, Theorem 14 also holds for o. 
Since operator o satisfies ( 1) of Lemma B.2, it also satisfies postulate (Cl) according 
to Theorem 14. 
To show that operator o does not satisfy postulate (C3), consider Table B.l where 
Mods(cu) ={wz,wg} and Mods(p) ={w~,q}. We haveBel(~ocY) kp, butBel((K0 
,u) o cu) F jz, which violates postulate (C3). 
To show that operator o does not satisfy postulate (C4), consider Table B.2 where 
Mods(a) = {wz,w~} and Mods(,u) = {WI, WI}. We have Bel( K o a)) p -JL, but 
Be/( (K o p) o (Y) b ~,u, which violates postulate (C4). 
Proof of Theorem 16 
( I ) Postulate (C5) is equivalent to (CR5). 
(+) Suppose that (CR5) holds. Assume ly o ,u + VY and (p o pu) o (Y + ,u. 
We want to show W o cy + ,u. ‘* By Lemma 10, there exists wg k ,U A T(Y such 
that w3 <Al w for all w k p A a. Also by Lemma 10, there exists WI b cy A p 
such that WI <,J,~~ w2 for all w2 k a /\ 1~. Therefore, by condition (CR5) 
and since 03 <p WI, there exists WI t= cy II ,u such that WI <O w:! for all 
w? b Q A 1,~. Hence, by Lemma 10, we have 1v o LY b p. 
I2 We are proving the contrapositive of postulate (C5). 
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(e=> Suppose that (0) holds. Assume WI,W~ k ,u, w2 /= -p, w3 cyf W, 
and 01 <poIL ~2. We want to show WI cII, ~2. ” Let LY be such that Mods(a) = 
{WI, ~2). Then p o ,z /= lcr by Lemma 10 since w3 /= p A T(Y, w3 <,,, wI and 
Mods(,u A a> = {WI}. Also, (P o ,u) 0 (Y /= p by Lemma 10 since WI /== a A pu. 
@I -+0/l w2 and Mods(aAy) = (~2). Then pea k p by the contrapositive of 
postulate ((3). Moreover, WI <Y w2 by Lemma 10 since Mods(p A a) = {w,} 
and Mods( a A -y) = { ~2). 
Postulate (C6) is equivalent to (CR6). 
(=+) Suppose that (CR6) holds. Assume Y o p b la and ly o cy b 7~. We 
want to show (W o ,u) 0 a k l,u. By Lemma 10, there exists WJ k ,u A T(Y such 
that w3 <Y w for all w /= p A LY. Also by Lemma 10, there exists w2 /= (Y A 7~ 
such that w2 <p WI for all WI k aAp. Therefore, by condition (CR6) and since 
w3 <v WI, there exists w2 k cz A 1~ such that w2 <pop WI for all WI /= LY A ,u. 
Hence, by Lemma 10, we have (3v o pu) o (Y /= 7~. 
(-+I> Suppose that (C6) holds. Assume WI, 03 /= ,u, w2 /= -p, 03 -+ wI 
and 122 <p ~1. We want to show w2 <yoti w 1. Let LY be such that Mods(a) = 
{WI, ~2). Then p o p k la by Lemma 10 since w3 /= ,u A -1cy, w3 <V WI and 
Mods(puAa) = {WI}. Moreover, pocu k 1~ by Lemma 10 since w2 /= cu~lk, 
w2 <p WI and Mods(LuAp) = {WI}. Then (?Po~)ocu /= 7~ by postulate (C6). 
Moreover, w2 <voF WI since Mods(aA -,u) = (~2) and Mods(cuA p) = {WI}. 
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